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oppositional themes of harmonisation versus regulatory 
competition in European company law. Instead of embracing one 
approach over the other in exclusivity, the article draws attention 
to the persisting mixture of approaches to an emerging European-
wide law regulating the business corporation. Against the 
background of an ongoing struggle over identifying the goals and 
taboos of the European legislator's mandate in regulating the 
company, the argument put forward here is that this very struggle 
is reflective of the nature of the evolution of company law in an 
'integrating Europe and a globalising world'. European attempts of 
developing European company law as part of a larger initiative of 
improving the Union's potential for innovation and competition 
are thus likely to meet with the challenges that contemporary 
Nation States are facing when adapting their modes of regulation 
and representation to the demands of an increasingly complex and 
decentralised fields of market activities. Situating the law of the 
business corporation within the larger theme of European 
integration on the one hand, and of issues of market regulation, 
domestic, transnational, and international, on the other, suggests 
the adoption of a systems theory-based approach to understanding 
the boundaries of law in this multilevel and multipolar process.  
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Law is a scavenger. It grows by feeding on ideas from outside, not by inventing 
new ones of its own. 
E. D. Elliott, (1985) 85 Columbia Law Review 38  
 
The law is full of phraseology drawn from morals, and by the mere force of 
language continually invites us to pass from one to the other without perceiving 
it, as we are sure to do unless we have the boundary constantly before our 
minds. 
O. W. Holmes Jr., (1897)10 Harvard Law Review 457, 459–460  
 
I CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, AND 
GLOBAL MARKETS 
The process of European company law harmonisation offers itself 
as a case in point for an inquiry into the intricate process of 
European integration. At the same time, it illustrates the nature of 
legal evolution as reflected in the increasingly multilevel and 
trans-territorialised norm production in the law of corporate 
governance. On the one hand, business has for a long time now 
come to be organised in a globe-spanning manner, with 
historically strong attempts to liberate itself of Nation States’ 
regulatory aspirations or constraints.1 This is part of the Nation 
                                            
1 C. Schmitthoff, 'International Business Law: A New Law Merchant', (1961) 2 Current Law 
and Social Problems 129-153; J.-P. Robé, 'Multinational Enterprises: The Constitution of a 
Pluralistic Legal Order', in G. Teubner (eds.), Global Law Without A State (Aldershot, 
1997); F. D. Ly, 'Lex Mercatoria (New Law Merchant): Globalisation and International Self-
Regulation', in V. Gessner,R. P. Appelbaum and W. F. Felstiner (eds.), Rules and Networks. 
The Legal Culture of Global Business Transactions (Hart Publishing, 2001); A. C. Cutler, 
Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Economy 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
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State’s larger struggle over regulatory sovereignty with regard to 
the economic processes that unfold within and beyond national 
borders. On the other hand, however, corporations remain, in 
many respects, embedded in a complex field of historically grown, 
institutionally and legally structured frameworks of national 
regulation and administration.2 National corporate laws are 
embedded in distinct socio-economic cultures, historically grown 
legal and industrial régimes. Scholars in comparative corporate 
governance have become increasingly aware of the methodological 
challenges in comparing different corporate governance régimes. 
After early critiques of a functional approach to comparative law,3 
comparative legal scholarship has become much more nuanced, 
contextualised, and differentiated.4 Contemporary works place 
great emphasis on the particular cultures of corporate governance 
                                            
2 M. O'Sullivan, 'Corporate Governance and Globalization', (2000) 570 The Annals of The 
American Academy of Political and Social Science [ANNALS] 153-172; J. W. Cioffi/S. S. 
Cohen, 'The state, law and corporate governance: the advantage of forwardness', in S. S. 
Cohen and G. Boyd (eds.), Corporate Governance and Globalization. Long Range Planning 
Issues (Edward Elgar, 2000); that ‘culture’ matters greatly, has been acknowledged widely, 
see only B. R. Cheffins, 'Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to 
Milan via Toronto', (1999) 10 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 5-42; J. Fanto, 'The Role of 
Corporate Law in French Corporate Governance', (1998) 31 Cornell Int'l L.J. 31-91; R. 
Buxbaum/K. J. Hopt, Legal Harmonization and the Business Enterprise. Corporate and 
Capital Market Law Harmonization Policy in Europe and the U.S.A. (Walter de Gruyter, 
1988); K. J. Hopt, 'Common Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe?' in J. A. 
McCahery,P. Moerland,T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneborg (eds.), Corporate Governance 
Regimes. Convergence and Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2002); Á. R. Oquendo, 
'Breaking on Through to the Other Side: Understanding European Corporate Governance', 
(2001) 22 U. Pa. Intl'l Econ. L. 975-1027, 976. 
3 J. Hill, 'Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory', (1989) 9 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 101-115. 
4 See for example the helpful study by W. W. Bratton/J. A. McCahery, 'Comparative 
Corporate Governance and Barriers to Global Cross Reference', in J. A. McCahery,P. 
Moerland,T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneborg (eds.), Corporate Governance Regimes. 
Convergence and Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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norms, the role of institutions, policies, path dependency, and 
innovation:5  
Corporate governance practices are partly cultural and historical 
products. In this context, culture can be defined as the conceptual 
framework whereby individuals, generally of the same country, 
understand and mediate the pressures of the world and motivate as well 
as explain their actions. As the corporation is a meaningful and 
purposeful human response to economic and social pressures, culture 
clearly informs corporate governance practices.6 
The considerably short history of European company law contains 
much evidence of this. In spite of a strong push for streamlining in 
some areas, particularly in capital market law due to increased 
demands for transparency and more efficient management control, 
it is likely that national obstacles will continue to crowd the route 
towards a European wide company law.7 European company law 
reflects the persisting challenges to European integration in that it 
                                            
5 See foremost M. J. Roe, 'Path Dependence, Political Options and Governance Systems', in 
K. J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Comparative Corporate Governance. Essays and 
Materials (Walter de Gruyter, 1997). 
6 J. Fanto, 'The Role of Corporate Law in French Corporate Governance', (1998) 31 Cornell 
Int'l L.J. 31-91, at 36. 
7 Most recently L. Enriques, 'Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered: What Role for 
the EC?' (2005) ECGI Law Working Paper No. 53/2005 (November) 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=850005; G. Hertig/J. A. McCahery, 'An Agenda for Reform: 
Company and Takeover Law in Europe', in G. Ferrarini,K. J. Hopt,J. Winter and E. 
Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe (Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 24: “…EU Company law can be viewed largely as an incomplete and rather 
ineffective set of provisions.” See already K. J. Hopt, 'Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht - 
Krise und neue Anläufe', (1998) 43 Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 96-106; K. J. Hopt, 
'Common Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe?' in J. A. McCahery,P. 
Moerland,T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneborg (eds.), Corporate Governance Regimes. 
Convergence and Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2002); A. Rebérioux, 'European Style 
of Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: The Role of Worker Involvement', (2002) 40 
Journal of Common Market Studies 111-134; P. Zumbansen, 'European Corporate Law and 
National Divergences: The Case of Takeover Law', (2004b) 3 Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev. 
867-886; J. S. Knudsen, 'Is the Single Market an Illusion? Obstacles to Reform of EU 
Takeover Regulation', (2005) 11 European Law Journal 507-524, 515. 
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highlights the difficulties of creating a body of law for social actors 
who have been relying on national rules, institutions, and customs 
within the Nation State.8 The parallel efforts of realising the 
freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital 
through both the European legislator and the European Court of 
Justice9 have created a wide range of European-wide applicable 
rules.10 However, this process has at the same time consistently 
highlighted the immense political and socio-economic obstacles 
growing out of Member States’ different ‘models of capitalism’,11 
often associated with substantive costs in bringing about an 
                                            
8 See only F. Kübler, 'The Rules of Capital Under Pressure of the Securities Markets', in K. 
J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Capital Markets and Company Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 100-101. 
9 See below notes 53 ff and accompanying text for a discussion of the Centros (1999), 
Überseering (2002) and Inspire Art (2003) decisions of the European Court of Justice. See 
hereto E. Wymeersch, 'Centros: A Landmark Decision in European Company Law', in T. 
Baums,K. J. Hopt and N. Horn (eds.), Corporations, Capital Markets and Business in the 
Law. Liber Amicorum Richard M. Buxbaum (Kluwer Law International, 2000); W. F. Ebke, 
'The 'Real Seat' Doctrine in the Conflict of Corporate Laws', (2002) 36 The International 
Lawyer 1015-1037; W.-H. Roth, 'From Centros to Ueberseering: Free Movement of 
Companies, Private International Law, and Community Law', (2003) 52 ICLQ 177-208; C. 
Kersting/C. C. Schindler, 'The ECJ's Inspire Art Decision of 30 September 2003 and its 
Effects on Practice', (2003) 4 German Law Journal 1277-1291. 
10 See the overview and analysis by J. Wouters, 'European Company Law: Quo Vadis?' 
(2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 257-307; recently S. Grundmann, Europäisches 
Gesellschaftsrecht. Eine systematische Darstellung unter Einbeziehung des 
Kapitalmarktrechts (C.F. Müller, 2004); see also the constantly updated website of the EU: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/official/.  
11 Most recently: J. S. Knudsen, 'Is the Single Market an Illusion? Obstacles to Reform of 
EU Takeover Regulation', (2005) 11 European Law Journal 507-524, 524; see already the 
intricate critique by M. Rhodes/B. v. Apeldoorn, 'Capital Unbound? The Transformation of 
European corporate governance', (1998) 5 Journal of European Public Policy 406-427 
(reprinted in Thomas Clarke, ed., Theories of Corporate Governance. The Philosophical 
Foundations of Corporate Law (London/New York: Routledge, 2004), 243; A. Rebérioux, 
'European Style of Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: The Role of Worker 
Involvement', (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 111-134. For a recent 
exposition of the “Models of Capitalism”, see C. Crouch, 'Models of Capitalism', (2005) 10 
New Political Economy 439-456. 
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effective regulatory régime for companies operating and investing 
on the European market.12 
In this article I will argue that the varied developments that 
characterise the evolution of European company law must be seen 
in correlation with the ambiguities in the EU’s general struggle 
over its normative identity, its institutional and procedural design, 
and its larger political and constitutional future (I). Two 
alternative and competing approaches to explain the progress of 
European company law, namely harmonization and regulatory 
competition, will be critiqued as offering only an insufficient 
explanation for the particular obstacles faced by European 
company law. The political economy of European company law 
will be analysed against the background of the deep embeddedness 
of company law rules in national legal systems on the one hand, 
and their increasing erosion through a transnational law of 
corporate governance that is predominantly driven by capital 
market and securities law concerns on the other (II). The third part 
of the article explores the quality of the legal challenge to 
European integration and to European company law with regard to 
the larger transformation of regulatory instruments. In studying 
how the emergence of private law-making increasingly illuminates 
our understanding of law itself, its normative authority, and its 
‘boundaries’,13 it becomes apparent how both the process of 
                                            
12 G. Hertig, 'Western Europe's Corporate Governance Dilemma', in T. Baums,K. J. Hopt 
and N. Horn (eds.), Corporations, Capital Markets and Business in the Law. Liber 
Amicorum Richard M. Buxbaum (Kluwer Law International, 2000); G. Hertig/J. A. 
McCahery, 'An Agenda for Reform: Company and Takeover Law in Europe', in G. 
Ferrarini,K. J. Hopt,J. Winter and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover 
Law in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2004), 39-40; F. Kübler, 'The Rules of Capital 
Under Pressure of the Securities Markets', in K. J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Capital 
Markets and Company Law (Oxford University Press, 2003), 101-103; L. Enriques, 
'Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered: What Role for the EC?' (2005) ECGI Law 
Working Paper No. 53/2005 (November) http://ssrn.com/abstract=850005, 16-22. 
13 N. Luhmann, Law as a Social System (K.Ziegert transl., F.Kastner, D.Schiff, R.Nobles, 
R.Ziegert eds.) (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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European integration and European company law are situated in 
the broader context of studying the role of law in transnational 
regulatory contexts (III). 
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A European Integration and Globalization 
The most important general legal questions, it seems to me, both in 
theory and in practice, concern, first, the nature of the relationship 
between a society and the legal rules that operate within it, and, second, 
the forces that cause law to change. 
A. Watson, (1982) 131 University of Philadelphia Law Review 
1121 
While many problems inherent to the building of a large and 
complex polity remain, such as the genesis of rights based on 
membership or individual freedom,14 the process of European 
integration does not take place within a spatial void. Our focus on 
the place in which European integration takes place must not 
make us blind to the forces that shape the space ‘Europe’, as it is 
part of processes of global economic integration, political struggle 
over dominance and power, cultural identity and, importantly, the 
rule of law. In an era of globalisation, the EU’s ongoing struggle 
over the role of law is mirrored by the threat that follows from the 
trans-territorialisation of societal activities.15 As already aptly 
perceived by Niklas Luhmann in the 1970s,16 the law faces a 
particular challenge in the attempt to address its own capacities 
when dealing with extra-territorial incidents and processes. With 
societal activities unfolding in what has become a global society,17 
the law as a particularly differentiated, historically emerged and 
institutionally embedded mechanism of stabilising social 
                                            
14 Excellent hereto: U. Haltern, 'Integration Through Law', in T. Diez and A. Wiener (eds.), 
European Integration Theory (Oxford University Press, 2004), at 188-191; H. Lindahl, 
'European Integration: Popular Sovereignty and a Politics of Boundaries', (2000) 6 European 
Law Journal 239-256, at 243-4. 
15 S. Sassen, 'Globalization or denationalization?' (2003) 10 Rev. Int'l Pol. Econ. 1-22. 
16 N. Luhmann, 'Die Weltgesellschaft', (1970) 57 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 
1. 
17 See Fischer-Lescano, Globalverfassung. Die Geltungsbegründing der Menschenrechte im 
postmodernen ius gentium (Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2005). 
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expectations by providing time-binding norms, is threatened to 
lose the very foundations on which it could so far perform its 
fragile function.18 
 B European Company Law in the Process of European 
Integration 
In the ‘European company law scene’,19 the discussion has evolved 
dramatically since its early beginnings with the European 
Economic Communities.20 Studying the development of European 
                                            
18 This is reiterated in the last chapter of N. Luhmann, Law as a Social System (K.Ziegert 
transl., F.Kastner, D.Schiff, R.Nobles, R.Ziegert eds.) (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
19 C. Schmitthoff, 'The Future of the European Company Law Scene', in C. Schmitthoff 
(eds.), The Harmonisation of European Company Law (The U.K. Nat'l. Committee of 
Comparative Law, 1973). 
20 Schwartz, 'Zur Konzeption der Rechtsangleichung in der Europäischen 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft', in (eds.), Festschrift für Walter Hallstein 1966); D. Vagts, 
'Reforming the 'Modern Corporation': Perspectives from the German', (1966) 80 Harvard 
Law Review 23-89; E. v. Caemmerer, 'Europäische Aktiengesellschaft', in K. H. 
Biedenkopf,H. Coing and E.-J. Mestmäcker (eds.), Das Unternehmen in der Rechtsordnung. 
Festgabe für Heinrich Kronstein aus Anlass seines 70. Geburtstages am 12.9.1967 
(C.F.Müller, 1967); P. Leleux, 'Harmonisation des droits des sociétés', in E. von Caemmerer 
(eds.), Europäische Handelsgesellschaft und Angleichung des nationalen 
Gesellschaftsrechts. Wissenschaftliches Kolloquium der Fachgruppe Europarecht - 
Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft für Europarecht - am 5./6.Mai 1967 in Bad Ems (Alfred 
Metzner, 1968); M. Lutter, 'Die Rechtsangleichung im Gesellschaftsrecht', in E. von 
Caemmerer (eds.), Europäische Handelsgesellschaft und Angleichung des nationalen 
Gesellschaftsrechts. Wissenschaftliches Kolloquium der Fachgruppe Europarecht - 
Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft für Europarecht - am 5./6.Mai 1967 in Bad Ems (Alfred 
Metzner, 1968); C. W. A. Timmermans, 'Die europäische Rechtsangleichung im 
Gesellschaftsrecht. Eine integrations- und rechtspolitische Analyse', (1984) 48 RabelsZ 1-
47; R. Buxbaum/K. J. Hopt, Legal Harmonization and the Business Enterprise. Corporate 
and Capital Market Law Harmonization Policy in Europe and the U.S.A. (Walter de 
Gruyter, 1988); K. v. Hulle, 'The Harmonisation of Company Law in the European 
Community', in B. Wachter,K. van Hulle,W. Landau,J. R. Schaafsma and M. Raaijmakers 
(eds.), Harmonisation of company and securities law. The European and American 
approach (Tilburg University Press, 1989); D. Charny, 'Competition among Jurisdictions in 
Formulating Corporate Rules: An American Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the 
European Communities', (1991) 32 Harvard International Law Journal (Harv. Int'l L.J.) 
423-456; R. J. Gilson, 'The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the 
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company law over the past few decades reveals a wealth of 
institutional histories, discourses and blockades, national path-
dependencies, and an increasing push from the world around to 
adapt some baselines of company law and securities law in Europe 
to international standards. That this discussion has been 
continuing predominantly with regard to the term ‘corporate 
governance’ is a telling fact. The term corporate governance has 
increasingly come to encompass all bodies of law applicable to the 
modern business corporation. Yet, a confined understanding of the 
term would focus on the rules that govern the distribution and 
exercise of power and control of management and shareholders in 
a large, publicly held corporation. Expanding this focus, a wider, 
more far-reaching term would aim at capturing the complex 
interplay of various bodies of law as they shape the regulatory 
                                                                                                                
European Corporate Governance Environment', in K. J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds.), 
European Takeovers. Law and Practice (Butterworths, 1992); A. Dorresteijn/I. Kuiper/G. 
Morse, European Corporate Law (Kluwer, 1994); G. A. Bermann, 'Harmonization and 
Regulatory Federalism', in I. Pernice (eds.), Harmonization of Legislation in Federal 
Systems (Nomos, 1996); H. J. Goldschmidt, 'Harmonization of Corporate Law in Federal 
Systems: A United States Perspective - Comments', in I. Pernice (eds.), Harmonization of 
Legislation in Federal Systems (Nomos, 1996); V. Edwards, EC Company Law (Oxford 
University Press, 1999); J. Wouters, 'European Company Law: Quo Vadis?' (2000) 37 
Common Market Law Review 257-307; G. Hertig, 'Western Europe's Corporate Governance 
Dilemma', in T. Baums,K. J. Hopt and N. Horn (eds.), Corporations, Capital Markets and 
Business in the Law. Liber Amicorum Richard M. Buxbaum (Kluwer Law International, 
2000); S. Deakin, 'Regulatory Competition versus Reflexive Harmonisation in European 
Company Law', in D. C. Esty and D. Geradin (eds.), Regulatory Competition and Economic 
Integration. Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2001); M. Habersack, 
Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht, 2. Aufl. (C.H.Beck, 2003) (11999); K. Heine/W. Kerber, 
'European Corporate Laws, Regulatory Competition and Path Dependence', (2002) 13 
European Journal of Law and Economics 47-71; K. J. Hopt, 'Modern Company Law and 
Capital Market Problems. Improving European Corporate Governance after Enron', (2002) 
ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, WP No. 05/2002 at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/28/1857275.pdf; L. Enriques, 'Company Law Harmonization 
Reconsidered: What Role for the EC?' (2005) ECGI Law Working Paper No. 53/2005 
(November) http://ssrn.com/abstract=850005; E. Wymeersch, 'About Techniques of 
Regulating Companies in the European Union', in G. Ferrarini,K. J. Hopt,J. Winter and E. 
Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe (Oxford University 
Press, 2004). 
12 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 02 NO. 02 
 
reality of the corporation.21 Among these bodies of law, one will 
have to consider company/corporate law, securities law, labour 
and employment law, tax law as well as the larger field of rules 
relating to industrial relations, co-determination, vocational 
training, and even environmental protection.22 The term ‘corporate 
governance’, meandering between such narrow and wide 
meanings, reminds us thus of much older debates over the nature 
of the business corporation and its role in society.23 As will become 
clear in the following pages, these perennial issues accompany 
even the present debates in European company law. 
Not that the task of developing European company law ever was 
an easy one to begin with.24 The diversification of company law 
                                            
21 P. A. Gourevitch/J. Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control. The New Global 
Politics of Corporate Governance (Princeton University Press, 2005), 2: “Corporate 
Governance systems reflect public policy choices.” See also R. Kraakman/P. L. Davies/H. 
Hansmann/G. Hertig/K. J. Hopt/H. Kanda/E. B. Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A 
Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford University Press, 2004), 67-8. 
22 P. Zumbansen, 'The Parallel Worlds of Corporate Governance and Labor Law', 13 Indiana 
Journal of Global Studies forthcoming 
23 See, for example, the classical debate between Berle and Dodd: A. A. Berle, 'Corporate 
Powers as Powers in Trust', (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 1049-1074; E. M. Dodd, 'For 
Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?' (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1145-1163; A. A. 
Berle, 'For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees', (1931) 45 Harvard Law Review 1365-
1372; see, later, A. A. Berle, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (Harcourt, Brace & 
World, 1954). In Germany, see above all the still breathtaking study by W. Rathenau, Vom 
Aktienwesen (S. Fischer, 1918); see later, for example, G. Teubner, 'Unternehmensinteresse - 
das gesellschaftliche Interesse des Unternehmens "an sich"?' (1985) 149 ZHR 470-488; for a 
discussion of these debates and their contemporary recurrence, see P. Zumbansen, 
Innovation und Pfadabhängigkeit. Das Recht der Unternehmensverfassung in der 
Wissensgesellschaft (Habilitation thesis, University of Frankfurt) forthcoming)Ch. 1. 
24 C. Schmitthoff, 'The Future of the European Company Law Scene', in C. Schmitthoff 
(eds.), The Harmonisation of European Company Law (The U.K. Nat'l. Committee of 
Comparative Law, 1973); C. W. A. Timmermans, 'Die europäische Rechtsangleichung im 
Gesellschaftsrecht. Eine integrations- und rechtspolitische Analyse', (1984) 48 RabelsZ 1-
47; C. W. A. Timmermans, 'Harmonization in the Future of Company Law in Europe', in K. 
J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Capital Markets and Company Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2003). 
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into a larger research field of corporate governance renders the 
EC’s agenda in the field of European company law even more 
difficult. While the Enron, WorldCom and TyCo earthquakes have 
shaken up the legal and political consciousness worldwide,25 
Europe not only discovers its own dead bodies (Ahold, Parmalat), 
but continues to face serious obstacles on its way to further 
consolidating company and securities law rules across an enlarged 
Europe of twenty-five Member States.26 With the dramatic moves 
undertaken by Brussels in the past years towards developing 
company and securities law as vital pillars of an overall attempt to 
improve Europe’s international competitiveness,27 there have been 
numerous initiatives on the domestic and the European level to 
further outline the challenges and obstacles for a European 
company law.28 Just as the Enron shock was to make its way across 
the Atlantic and frantic attempts unfolded to persuade the DC 
lawmakers to refrain from issuing listing rules for the New York 
Stock Exchange that would likely prove incompatible with 
                                            
25 See the excellent account by W. W. Bratton, 'Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder 
Value', (2002) 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1275-1361; S. Deakin/S. J. Konzelmann, 'Learning from 
Enron', (2004) 12 Corporate Governance 134-142. 
26 See hereto the contributions in Bermann/Pistor (eds.), Law and Governance in an 
Enlarged Union (Hart Publishing, 2004). 
27 EU-Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament: Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the 
European Union – A plan to move forward, 21 May 2003, COM (2003) 284, 6', (2003) 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/eng/com/cnc/2003/com2003_0284de01.pdf.  
28 See, for an excellent overview (dating from 2002), E.-M. Kieninger, Wettbewerb der 
Rechtsordnungen im Europäischen Binnenmarkt (Mohr Siebeck, 2002); S. Mock, 
'Harmonization, Regulation and Legislative Competition in European Corporate Law', in: 
2002 3 German Law Journal, available at: 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/current_issue.php?id=216; more recently: S. 
Grundmann, Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht. Eine systematische Darstellung unter 
Einbeziehung des Kapitalmarktrechts (C.F. Müller, 2004); P. Zumbansen, 'European 
Corporate Law and National Divergences: The Case of Takeover Law', (2004b) 3 Wash. U. 
Glob. Stud. L. Rev. 867-886; for an overview of the EU’s activities, see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/index_en.htm  
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continental corporate governance rules,29 the EU was in the midst 
of facing its own corporate governance challenge. 
The parallel deadlocks of adopting the statute for the Societas 
Europaea (SE),30 an attempt that had proven futile for three 
decades, and of passing a EU directive governing corporate 
takeovers in Europe,31 an undertaking that had already been 
brought on the way in 1989,32 constituted serious problems for a 
European administration that—in tandem with many of its 
Member States—feverishly worked towards a level playing field of 
companies in Europe. Throughout the 1990s, it had increasingly 
seemed as if the process of European company law integration had 
                                            
29 N. Tollet, 'The Societas Europea: Europeanization via Americanization of Corporate Law. 
Corporate Governance: Only One Model?' (2005) 5 Global Jurist Topics Art. 3, at 
http://www.bepress.com/gj/topics/vol5/iss2/art3. 
30 E. Werlauff, 'The SE Company - A New Common European Company from 8 October 
2004', (2003) 14 European Business Law Review [EBLR] 85-103; C. Teichmann, 'The 
European Company - A Challenge to Academics, Legislatures and Practitioners', in: 4 
German Law Journal No. 4 (1 April 2003), pp. 309-330, available at: 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com; V. Edwards, 'The European Company - Essential Tool 
or Eviscerated Dream?' (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 443-464; S. Ebert, 'The 
European Company on the Level Playing Field of the Community', (2003) 14 European 
Business Law Review [EBLR] 183-192; T. L. Blackburn, 'The Societas Europea: The 
Evolving European Corporation Statute', (1993) 61 Fordham Law Review 695-772. 
31 B. Pettet, 'Private versus Public Regulation in the field of Takeovers: The Future under the 
Directive', (2000) European Business Law Review [EBLR] 381-388; K. J. Hopt, 'European 
Takeover Regulation: Barriers to and Problems of Harmonizing Takeover Law in the 
European Community', in K. J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds.), European Takeovers. Law 
and Practice (Butterworths, 1992); R. J. Gilson, 'The Political Ecology of Takeovers: 
Thoughts on Harmonizing the European Corporate Governance Environment', in K. J. Hopt 
and E. Wymeersch (eds.), European Takeovers. Law and Practice (Butterworths, 1992); 
Zumbansen (2004b), supra. 
32 T. Raaijmakers, 'Takeover Regulation in Europe and America: The Need for Functional 
Convergence', in J. A. McCahery,P. Moerland,T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneborg (eds.), 
Corporate Governance Regimes. Convergence and Diversity (Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
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lost its momentum.33 Finally, with the breakthrough at the 2000 
Nice Summit for the SE statute, which subsequently got adopted 
in 2001 and went into force in October 2004, on the one hand, and 
with the all-exhausting passage of an eventually, much watered-
down Takeover Directive34 by the European Parliament in 
December 2003, on the other, this long persisting stasis seemed to 
have come to an end. Moreover, the European Commission had 
seized upon the widespread uneasiness with the state of affairs to 
install an expert commission, whose first mandate had been to 
extrapolate the existing resistances against a European takeover 
régime and to develop a model that would be likely to satisfy the 
opponents.35 With the group of experts, under the direction of 
Dutch law professor, Jaap Winter, presenting the report in 
admirably short time, the group received a follow-up mandate, 
which might be seen as the starting point of a new phase in 
European company lawmaking: the group, again directed by 
Winter, launched a comprehensive online consultation on an 
outline for a ‘Modernized Company Law in Europe’—three 
months after presenting the first report to the public.36 The second 
report by the High Level Group was made available after a careful 
analysis of the input from the online consultation in November 
2002.37 Soon after, in May 2003, the European Commission issued 
                                            
33 J. Wouters, 'European Company Law: Quo Vadis?' (2000) 37 Common Market Law 
Review 257-307. 
34 S. Maul/A. Kouloridas, 'The Takeover Bids Directive', (2004) 5 German Law Journal 
355-366, at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/.Vol05No04/PDF_Vol_05_No_04_355-
366_Private_Maul_Kouloridas.pdf 
35 J. Winter, 'Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues related to 
Takeover Bids', (2002) at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/2002-01-hlg-
report_en.pdf. 
36 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/modern/index.htm.  
37 See J. Winter, 'Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on A Modern 
Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe', (2002) at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/modern/consult/report_en.
pdf. 
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its Communication to the Council and the European Parliament: 
‘Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate 
Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward’ 
(‘Action Plan’).38 
In the two years since the Commission’s Action Plan, the 
Commission has brought on the way a number of initiatives that 
build on the detailed programme laid out in 2003.39 These 
initiatives are developed against the background of intense reform 
debates in the various Member States, not only with regard to the 
apparently inevitable move towards independent directors as 
mandated by the USA’s 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act,40 but also in 
light of increasing pressure on existing systems of corporate 
management and industrial relations, in particular Germany’s 
model of co-determination.41 These activities increasingly unfold 
in a complex regulatory environment of state-set statutory law on 
the one hand, and of norms produced by expert commissions, 
                                            
38 Available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2003/com2003_0284en01.pdf. 
39 For an updated overview, see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/index_en.htm and 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/ecgforum/index_en.htm.  
40 J. N. Gordon, 'Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order of 
Sarbanes-Oxley', (2003) Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, 
Discussion Paper No. 416 (April), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=391363 at 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/law_economics/wp_listing_1/wp_author?excl
usive=filemgr.download&file_id=69105&rtcontentdisposition=filename%3DWP216.pdf 
, R. Thompson, 'Corporate Governance After Enron: The First Year', (2003) Vanderbilt 
University Law School, Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 03-13, 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=429622 at www.ssrn.com  
41 See, e.g., T. Baums, 'Interview: Reforming German Corporate Governance: Inside a Law 
Making Process of a very new nature', (2001) 2 German Law Journal at: 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=43; K. J. Hopt, 'Corporate 
Governance in Germany', in K. J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Capital Markets and 
Company Law (Oxford University Press, 2003); see also J. Dammann, 'The Future of 
Codetermination after Centros: Will German Corporate Law move closer to the U.S. 
Model?' (2003) 8 Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 607. 
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think-tanks, quasi-public regulatory bodies, and private 
corporations on the other.42 That the European legislator should 
concern itself with issues as precarious and contested as executive 
compensation,43 while the Court of Justice marches on with 
increasing pressure on Member States’ rules on company seats,44 
are clear signs of an ever-faster diversifying agenda for Brussels’ 
European company law programme. 
Any attempt, therefore, at rendering an adequate picture of 
European company law making has to start from the premise that 
such rules are now developed in and emerging from a multilevel 
process of norm-production. With this, a study of European 
company law necessarily has to take into consideration the impact 
of different localities and types of norm-production on the 
emergence of European wide rules and standards, but also the 
persisting patterns of political opposition against reform.45 The 
German rules governing worker participation in business 
                                            
42 Hereto, see P. Zumbansen, Innovation und Pfadabhängigkeit. Das Recht der 
Unternehmensverfassung in der Wissensgesellschaft (Habilitation thesis, University of 
Frankfurt) forthcoming); see also the overview of corporate governance codes in Europe, 
issued and constantly updated by the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), at 
http://www.ecgi.org/.  
43 See the Commission Recommendation of 14 December 2004, available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/directors-remun/index_en.htm  
44 K. Bälz/T. Baldwin, 'The End of the Real Seat Theory (Sitztheorie): the European Court 
of Justice Decision in Ueberseering of 5 November 2002 and its Impact on German and 
European Company Law', in: No.12 3 German Law Journal, available at: 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/current_issue.php?id=214; C. Kersting/C. C. Schindler, 
'The ECJ's Inspire Art Decision of 30 September 2003 and its Effects on Practice', (2003) 4 
German Law Journal 1277-1291; W. Bayer, 'Die EuGH-Entscheidung Inspire Art und die 
deutsche GmbH im Wettbewerb der europäischen Rechtsordnungen', (2003) BB 2357-2366. 
45 G. Hertig/J. A. McCahery, 'An Agenda for Reform: Company and Takeover Law in 
Europe', in G. Ferrarini,K. J. Hopt,J. Winter and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company 
and Takeover Law in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2004), at 24; E. Wymeersch, 'About 
Techniques of Regulating Companies in the European Union', in G. Ferrarini,K. J. Hopt,J. 
Winter and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe 
(Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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corporations have, in that respect, become a notorious example of 
a régime deeply embedded in the country’s political economy. To 
touch on one part of the legal framework would likely result in a 
turmoil involving numerous other norms and institutions 
governing co-determination.46 Likewise, the described struggle over 
a European takeover régime did clearly reflect the complexities of 
a regulatory, socio-economic minefield made up of cultural 
predispositions, institutional traditions (Volkswagen47) and 
established networks—all of which make any capital market law-
oriented reformer frown, at best.48 
 
                                            
46 See, e.g., K. Pistor, 'Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance 
Externalities', in M. Blair and M. J. Roe (eds.), Employees and Corporate Governance 
(Brookings Institution, 1999); M. J. Roe, 'German Co-Determination and German Securities 
Markets', in K. J. Hopt,H. Kanda,M. J. Roe,E. Wymeersch and S. Prigge (eds.), 
Comparative Corporate Governance. The State of the Art and Emerging Research (Oxford 
University Press, 1998); M. Weiss, 'Zur aktuellen Bedeutung des Mitbestimmungsurteils - 
BVerfGE 50, 290 ff.' (2000) 83 Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und 
Rechtswissenschaft 405-418. 
47 See the Commission’s move against Germany with regard to the public holdings in the 
Volkswagen Group: 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/410&format=HTML&ag
ed=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; for a background, see J. Adolff, 'Turn of the Tide? 
The "Golden Share" Judgements of the European Court of Justice and the Liberalization of 
the European Capital Markets', in: 3 German Law Journal No. 8 (1 August 2002) available 
at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=170. 
48 C. Kirchner/R. W. Painter, 'Takeover Defenses under Delaware Law, the Proposed 
Thirteenth EU Directive and the New German Takeover Law: Comparison and 
Recommendations for Reform', (2002) 50 American Journal of Comparative Law 451-476. 
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C HARMONIZATION VERSUS REGULATORY 
COMPETITION 
The struggle over the different reasons for resistance against the SE 
or a Europe-wide takeover régime was continuously fought out 
with regard to a seemingly inescapable set of methodological 
approaches, harmonisation, and its allegedly exclusive alternative, 
regulatory competition.49 But not only the history of the SE and the 
Takeover Directive have contributed to a more differentiated 
reading of these approaches.50 While the comparison of state 
competition in the USA and the different conflict of laws régime 
in the European Community had occupied theorists for the longest 
time,51 change eventually came about by the European Court of 
                                            
49 See, e.g., K. Heine/W. Kerber, 'European Corporate Laws, Regulatory Competition and 
Path Dependence', (2002) 13 European Journal of Law and Economics 47-71; E. M. 
Kieninger, 'Rechtsentwicklung im Wettbewerb der Rechtsordnungen', in C. Ott and H.-B. 
Schäfer (eds.), Vereinheitlichung und Diversität des Zivilrechts in transnationalen Räumen 
(Mohr Siebeck, 2002); P. B. Stephan, 'The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in 
International Economic Law', (1999) Va. J. Int'l L. 743-797; S. Mock, 'Harmonization, 
Regulation and Legislative Competition in European Corporate Law', in: 2002 3 German 
Law Journal, available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/current_issue.php?id=216. 
50 G. Hertig/J. A. McCahery, 'An Agenda for Reform: Company and Takeover Law in 
Europe', in G. Ferrarini,K. J. Hopt,J. Winter and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company 
and Takeover Law in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2004), 28: “By linking together 
mutual recognition of corporate law systems, subsidiarity […] and minimum requirements, 
EU lawmakers have created a legal structure that supplies a degree of useful tension 
between regulatory competition and harmonization.” 
51 See, e.g. R. Buxbaum/K. J. Hopt, Legal Harmonization and the Business Enterprise. 
Corporate and Capital Market Law Harmonization Policy in Europe and the U.S.A. (Walter 
de Gruyter, 1988); P. Behrens, 'Krisensymptome in der Gesellschaftsrechtsangleichung', in 
U. Immenga,W. Möschel and D. Reuter (eds.), Festschrift für Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker 
zum 70. Geburtstag (Nomos, 1996); D. Charny, 'Competition among Jurisdictions in 
Formulating Corporate Rules: An American Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the 
European Communities', (1991) 32 Harvard International Law Journal (Harv. Int'l L.J.) 
423-456; E.-M. Kieninger, Wettbewerb der Rechtsordnungen im Europäischen Binnenmarkt 
(Mohr Siebeck, 2002). 
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Justice. The debate over the exportability of the US experience52 
took a different turn in light of the European Court of Justice’s 
Centros,53 Überseering,54 and Inspire Art55 rulings in 1999, 2002, 
and 2003. Leaving no doubt, the Inspire Art decision and the Court 
of Justice’s ruling in Laysterie du Saillant56 of 2004 underscored 
what even the staunchest defenders of the seat theory and the 
impossibility of regulatory competition among Member States for 
corporate charters could no longer deny: that corporations were 
free to incorporate in any Member State and that their 
incorporation would have to be recognised in another Member 
                                            
52 The literature is endless and continues to grow: W. L. Cary, 'Federalism and Corporate 
Law: Reflections Upon Delaware', (1974) 83 Yale Law Journal 663-705; R. K. Winter, 
'State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation', (1977) 6 Journal of 
Legal Studies 251-292; R. Romano, 'Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation 
Puzzle', (1985) 1 Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations 225-283; D. Charny, 
'Competition among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Rules: An American 
Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the European Communities', (1991) 32 Harvard 
International Law Journal (Harv. Int'l L.J.) 423-456; L. A. Bebchuk, 'Federalism and the 
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law', (1992) 105 
Harvard Law Review 1437-1510; L. A. Bebchuk/A. Ferrell, 'Federalism and Takeover Law: 
The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers', (1999) 99 Columbia Law Review 1168; E. 
M. Kieninger, 'Rechtsentwicklung im Wettbewerb der Rechtsordnungen', in C. Ott and H.-
B. Schäfer (eds.), Vereinheitlichung und Diversität des Zivilrechts in transnationalen 
Räumen (Mohr Siebeck, 2002); K. Heine, Regulierungswettbewerb im Gesellschaftsrecht. 
Zur Funktionsfähigkeit eines Wettbewerbs der Rechtsordnungen im europäischen 
Gesellschaftsrecht (Duncker & Humblot, 2003). 
53 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-Org., 1999 O.J. (C 136) 3. 
54 See Kilian Baelz & Teresa Baldwin, The End of the Real Seat Theory (Sitztheorie): The 
European Court of Justice Decision in Ueberseering of 5 November 2002 and its Impact on 
German and European Company Law, in 3 German L.J. No.12 (2002), available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/current_ issue.php?id=214. 
55 Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabriken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 
2003 O.J. (C 275) 10, available at http:// 
europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg= 
EN&numdoc =62001J016&model=guichett; see Kersting & Schindler, The ECJ's Inspire 
Art Decision of 30 September and Its Effects on Practice, in 4 German L.J. No.12, 1277-91 
(2003), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com /article.php?id=344. 
56 C-9/02 of 11 March 2004. 
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State.57 With this jurisprudence, the field had opened widely. The 
case law from Centros to Laysterie du Saillant gave powerful 
testimony of how deeply ingrained company law régimes were in 
the particular economic, political, and cultural history of the 
Member States.58 On their face, all cases dealt with the free 
movement of companies with regard to stated or alleged motives 
of escaping or circumventing certain minimum capital or tax 
requirements. While the minimum capital requirement goes to the 
heart of German corporate law for limited liability companies,59 it 
was clear to all that much more was at stake. The Court of 
Justice’s masterful approach to the complexity of Member States’ 
company law régimes baffled observers and commentators for 
years,60 and while it now can be seen as a given that the EU sees an 
                                            
57 See hereto W. F. Ebke, 'Centros - Some Realities and Some Mysteries', (2000) 48 Am.J. 
Comp. L. 623; E. Wymeersch, 'Centros: A Landmark Decision in European Company Law', 
in T. Baums,K. J. Hopt and N. Horn (eds.), Corporations, Capital Markets and Business in 
the Law. Liber Amicorum Richard M. Buxbaum (Kluwer Law International, 2000); H. 
Halbhuber, 'National Doctrinal Structures and European Company Law', (2001) 38 Common 
Market Law Review 1385-1420; W.-H. Roth, 'From Centros to Ueberseering: Free 
Movement of Companies, Private International Law, and Community Law', (2003) 52 ICLQ 
177-208; B. Seifert, '"Daily Mail", "Centros", "Überseering", "Inspire Art" - und kein Ende 
in Sicht!' (2003) GewArch 18-20; F. Wooldridge, 'Überseering: Freedom of Establishment 
of Companies Affirmed', (2003) 14 European Business Law Review [EBLR] 227-235. 
58 Zumbansen, Innovation und Pfadabhängigkeit, supra, Ch. 2, II. 
59 See only W. Bayer, 'Die EuGH-Entscheidung Inspire Art und die deutsche GmbH im 
Wettbewerb der europäischen Rechtsordnungen', (2003) BB 2357-2366; H. Eidenmüller, 
'Wettbewerb der Gesellschaftsrechte in Europa (Besprechung des EuGH-Urteils 
"Überseering")', (2002) 23 ZIP 2233-2245; E. Schanze/A. Jüttner, 'Die Entscheidung für 
Pluralität: Kollisionsrecht und Gesellschaftsrecht nach der EuGH-Entscheidung "Inspire 
Art"', (2003) AG 661-671; for an intriguing perspective, see L. Enriques/J. Macey, 'Creditors 
Versus Capital Formation: The Case Against the European Legal Capital Rules', (2001) 86 
Cornell Law Review 1165-1204. 
60 See only the references in H. Halbhuber, 'National Doctrinal Structures and European 
Company Law', (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 1385-1420; K. Bälz/T. Baldwin, 
'The End of the Real Seat Theory (Sitztheorie): the European Court of Justice Decision in 
Ueberseering of 5 November 2002 and its Impact on German and European Company Law', 
in: No.12 3 German Law Journal, available at: 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/current_issue.php?id=214; C. Kersting/C. C. Schindler, 
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emerging system of limited regulatory competition with regard to 
the free movement of capital, the undercurrents of this 
development become increasingly visible. In the aftermath of the 
case law pertaining to limited liability companies, the literature 
reflects on the climatic changes with regard to the chances of 
survival of national legal structures, in particular with regard to 
the law of corporate governance writ large.61 
The history of European company law can thus be read as one of 
continued breaks, discontinuities, incremental, and revolutionary 
overhauls. While the Commission still speaks of harmonisation62 
as an ‘essential for creating a Single Market for Financial services 
and products’, the experiences with the Societas Europaea, the 
Takeover Directive, and the free movement of companies case law 
from the Court of Justice suggests a differentiated reading of the 
term ‘harmonisation’,63 if not a fundamental disillusion.64 In the 
light of the complexity of institutions, rules, and values colliding 
in the just-described integration process, the opposition between 
harmonisation and regulatory competition seems to fall short of 
capturing the dimensions of today’s regulatory spaces such as the 
EU. Instead of being governed neither exclusively by centralised 
                                                                                                                
'The ECJ's Inspire Art Decision of 30 September 2003 and its Effects on Practice', (2003) 4 
German Law Journal 1277-1291. 
61 See, for example, J. Dammann, 'The Future of Codetermination after Centros: Will 
German Corporate Law move closer to the U.S. Model?' (2003) 8 Fordham Journal of 
Corporate & Financial Law 607; see the intriguing observations by E. Schanze/A. Jüttner, 
'Die Entscheidung für Pluralität: Kollisionsrecht und Gesellschaftsrecht nach der EuGH-
Entscheidung "Inspire Art"', (2003) AG 661-671 and W. F. Ebke, 'Überseering: "Die wahre 
Liberalität ist Anerkennung"', (2003) 58 JZ 927-933. 
62 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/index_en.htm. 
63 See hereto M. Dougan, 'Vive la Différence? Exploring the Legal Framework for Reflexive 
Harmonisation Within the Single European Market', in R. A. Miller and P. Zumbansen 
(eds.), Annual of German & European Law, Vol. I (2003) (Berghahn Books, 2004). 
64 L. Enriques, 'Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered: What Role for the EC?' (2005) 
ECGI Law Working Paper No. 53/2005 (November) http://ssrn.com/abstract=850005 
2006] REGULATORY COMPETITION 23 
 
forces working towards the establishment of unified or compatible 
rules through harmonisation nor by an efficiency-driven process of 
a market battle over ‘better rules’, we find a multipolar and 
multilevel interplay of norm-production, political discourse, 
cultural, and socio-economic debate.65 In light of an increasingly 
laden research and policy agenda of European integration 
dynamics,66 on the one hand, and of the above described 
proliferation of corporate rules, on the other, little hope ought to 
be attached to an explanatory model that does not fully illuminate 
these dimensions. In reaching beyond both harmonisation and 
regulatory competition in their respective, exclusionary, and 
absolutist aspirations, we strive for being able to learn to 
adequately assess the wealth of institutional, procedural, and 
normative dimensions that characterises multipart and multilevel 
régimes of policy making. 
  
                                            
65 See already J. H. H. Weiler, 'The Transformation of Europe', (1991) Yale Law Journal 
2403-2483; for a very rich analysis of Europe’s multi-dimensional discourses, see V. 
Schmidt, The Futures of European Capitalism (Oxford University Press, 2002); V. Schmidt, 
'Democracy and Discourse in an Integrating Europe and a Globalising World', (2005) 6 
European Law Journal 277-300; see also C. Joerges, 'Deliberative Supranationalism - Two 
Defences', (2002) 8 European Law Journal 133-151; C. Joerges, 'The Law's Problems with 
the Governance of the European Market', in C. Joerges and R. Dehousse (eds.), Good 
Governance in Europe's Integrated Market (Oxford University Press, 2002); C. Landfried, 
Das politische Europa. Differenz als Potential der Europäischen Union (Nomos, 2002), 11, 
55, noting an expansion of integration goals beyond the common market; this can be 
observed in many different fields: see, e.g., V. Mayer-Schönberger, 'Governing Networks: 
Telecommunication Deregulation in Europe and the United States', (2002) 27 Brook. J. Int'l 
L. 819-851; G. Howells/T. Wilhelmsson, 'EC Consumer Law: Has it Come of Age?' (2003) 
28 European Law Review 370-388; H. Callaghan, Battle of the systems of multi-level game? 
Domestic sources of Anglo-German quarrels over EU takeover law and worker 
consultation. Presentation at the 15th Annual Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of 
Socio-Economics, Aix-en-Provence, June 26-28, 2003, available at 
http://www.sase.org/conf2003/papers/callaghan_helen.pdf 2003). 
66 See the excellent overview and analysis by U. Haltern, 'Integration Through Law', in T. 
Diez and A. Wiener (eds.), European Integration Theory (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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D Undercurrents: European History, Globalization and 
the Unresolved Question of the EU’s Nature 
The study of the dynamics between harmonisation and regulatory 
competition leads us back to the more fundamental questions 
regarding the ultimate goals of integration. Perhaps the company 
lawyer might have very little to say on this matter. At the same 
time, European company law can be understood as being so closely 
intertwined with the contested issues of economical and political 
integration.67 In this light, European company law reflects not only 
a field of law, but at the same time it is in itself an ongoing 
regulatory process that continues to challenge Member States and 
their respective company law systems. Indeed, this process has so 
far not given the final upper hand to either of the two approaches. 
Instead, the persisting dynamic of European company law 
development mostly results from the strong tensions among the 
different systems and the legal framework constraining either of 
the two poles in their ideal-type form. Being a veritable ‘collision 
of systems’,68 we would be well advised to take a yet closer look at 
many proclamations of universal convergence in the law of 
corporate governance.69 This is not to say that there are very 
                                            
67 E. Stein, 'International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight', (2001) 95 
American Journal of International Law (A.J.I.L.) 489-534; C. Joerges, 'The Impact of 
European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist Perceptions, True Conflicts and a New 
Constitutional Perspective', (1997) 3 European Law Journal 378-406; see now the 
contributions to Lynn Dobson/Andreas Follesdal (eds.), Political Theory and the European 
Constitution (Routledge, 2004); J. Scott/D. Trubek, 'Mind the Gap: Law and New 
Approaches to Governance in the European Union', (2002) 8 European Law Journal 1-18, 
D. Trubek/L. G. Trubek, 'Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: the Role 
of the Open Method of Coordination', (2005) 11 European Law Journal 343-364; Haltern 
(2004), supra note 14. 
68 See for a recent exposition of this idea: A. Fischer-Lescano/G. Teubner, 'Regime-
Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law', (2004) 25 
Michigan J. Int'l L. 999-1046. 
69 See the critique by W. W. Bratton/J. A. McCahery, 'Comparative Corporate Governance 
and Barriers to Global Cross Reference', in J. A. McCahery,P. Moerland,T. Raaijmakers and 
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distinct signs of an increasingly shareholder-oriented approach in 
corporate governance finding its way into worldwide company and 
securities law reform. The argument here is neither to reject this 
trend nor to condemn it outright. But Europe’s very unique history 
of harmonisation/regulatory competition shows what is at stake in 
law reform with view to market demands and global integration.70 
It is therefore worthwhile to keep a wider perspective on the 
issues of law reform in integrating market systems. Just as much 
as the nature of the emerging polity EU remains a matter of heated 
debate, the reach of corporate law directly touches on more 
fundamental issues regarding the place of the company in a wider 
regulatory environment. To disconnect corporate law and 
corporate law reform from other trends of legal and political 
reform would be to deny the corporation’s embeddedness in a 
much larger context of regulatory change. 
  
II THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HARMONIZATION VERSUS 
REGULATORY COMPETITION 
National legal meaning is in a different ballpark 
 from European legal meaning.71 
 
A What Lies Beneath 
In this light, what would it mean to take a deeper look at 
harmonisation? From a harmonisation perspective, much of 
European law in its development and its adoption is closely 
monitored and analysed during the time of its inception. 
                                                                                                                
L. Renneborg (eds.), Corporate Governance Regimes. Convergence and Diversity (Oxford 
University Press, 2002) 
70 Excellent hereto: P. B. Stephan, 'The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in 
International Economic Law', (1999) Va. J. Int'l L. 743-797; P. B. Stephan, 'The Political 
Economy of Choice of Law', (2002) 90 Georgetown Law Journal 957-970. 
71 Haltern (2004), supra note 14, at 192. 
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Sometimes, this time will span over several years or, even decades, 
as was the case for the statute and Directive of the European 
Company or, still more recently, the Takeover Directive. In 
contrast, it is the time and the norms’ fate after the adoption of 
the European instrument that often escapes our attention. It can 
thus be expected, that in order to study the (remaining) potential 
of harmonisation politics, much emphasis and effort must be given 
to engage in a deeper and more serious inquiry into how exactly 
this transformation unfolds in different Member States.72 
Taking a closer look at the conceptualisation, adoption, and 
transformation of legal acts by the European lawmaker into the 
Member States’ legal régimes might well illuminate the tricky 
process by which norms find their way into a particular existing 
legal environment.73 Taking an evolutionary approach to the study 
of legal development and of company law in particular allows for 
two things: first, this approach—as has been argued by Niklas 
Luhmann,74 and—with regard to company law in particular—by 
Mark Roe75 or Simon Deakin,76 refutes any idea of a linear, one-
directional allegedly efficiency—or coherence-driven development 
of legal norms. Instead, this approach considers historical and 
                                            
72 This approach is taken by a new, multi-year research project at the University of Vienna, 
directed by Thomas Bachner. This part of the paper represents my comments on his project, 
presented at the European Law Research Centre at Harvard Law School on 18 November 
2004. 
73 G. Teubner, 'Legal Irritants: How Unifying Law Ends Up In New Divergences', in P. A. 
Hall and D. Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, 2001). 
74 N. Luhmann, 'Evolution und Geschichte', (1975) in: ders., Soziologische Aufklärung 2 
150-169. 
75 M. J. Roe, 'Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics', (1996) 109 Harv. L. Rev. 641-
668. 
76 S. Deakin, 'Evolution for our Time: A Theory of Legal Memetics', (2002) ESRC Centre 
for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 242 (also published in 
55 Current Legal Problems 2002, pp.1-42) at www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP242.pdf 
2006] REGULATORY COMPETITION 27 
 
political constellations and decisions that shaped particular 
developments. As these environments have been and continue to 
be in flux, legal development will always remain unpredictable to 
a certain degree. Second, an evolutionary approach can illuminate 
the very intricate forms in which norm collisions and norm 
reforms take place. Sometimes, they result from a veritable 
paradigm change or from the importation of foreign rules and 
principles, something that corporate governance scholars have 
been studying in the context of legal and economic reform projects 
in young or emerging democracies and transformation markets.77 
But even in less dramatic circumstances, the transformation and 
translation of European law to the Member State level often 
produces a myriad of effects within the national legal order,78 
laying bare the complexity of different co-evolving, social 
systems.79 From that perspective, one may observe the 
introduction of a certain rule or standard, or as in the example of 
the optional co-determination régime of the Societas Europaea,80 
even of a flexible option as having possibly severe repercussions in 
                                            
77 See Y. Dezalay/B. Garth, 'The Import and Export of Law and Legal Institutions: 
International Strategies in National Palace Wars', in D. Nelken and J. Feest (eds.), Adapting 
Legal Cultures (Hart Publishing, 2001); K. Pistor, 'The Standardization of Law and Its 
Effect on Developing Economies', (2002) 50 American Journal of Comparative Law 97 ff.; 
D. Berkowitz/K. Pistor/J.-F. Richard, 'Economic Development, legality, and the transplant 
effect', (2003) 47 European Economic Review 165-195. See in general A. Watson, Legal 
Transplants. An Approach to Comparative Law (Scottish Academia Press, 1974); W. Ewald, 
'How does it feel to try a rat?' (1995) 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1889-2149; P. Legrand, 'The Return 
of the Repressed: Moving Comparative Legal Studies Beyond Pleasure', (2001) 75 Tulane 
Law Review 1033-1051. 
78 See, for example, . 
79 Teubner (2001), supra; G. Teubner, 'Eigensinnige Produktionsregimes: Zur Ko-evolution 
von Wirtschaft und Recht in den varieties of capitalism', (1999) 5 Soziale Systeme 7-25. 
80 Hereto: M. Henssler, 'Unternehmerische Mitbestimmung in der Societas Europea. Neue 
Denkanstöße für die "Corporate Governance"-Diskussion', in M. Habersack,P. 
Hommelhoff,U. Hüffer and K. Schmidt (eds.), Festschrift für Peter Ulmer zum 70. 
Geburtstag am 2. Januar 2003 (De Gruyter Recht, 2003); B. Keller, 'The European 
company statute: employee involvement - and beyond', (2002) 33 Industrial Relations 
Journal 424-445. 
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the receiving legal culture.81 The idea of co-evolution further not 
only suggests unpredictable effects or even serious irritations in 
the receiving specific disciplinary or doctrinal area. In addition, co-
evolution will unfold in that the adaptation of the legal system to 
a particular rule will not be confined to the specific area, but the 
legal system’s adaptation is likely to have effects on the 
development of embedding, neighbouring systems.82 Among the 
neighbouring fields of corporate law, which will be particularly 
sensitive to changes in the corporate law régime, we find, for 
example, employment law, the norms governing industrial 
relations, and the rules of securities regulation. But, this wider 
perspective on the irritating, chaotic and non-linear, unpredictable 
effects of harmonisation83 again sheds light not only on the 
complex conditions of European company law making. It also 
underscores the intricate dynamics that characterise legal 
development as such. 
A systems theory-based, evolutionary approach to studying the 
process of European company law harmonisation is likely to 
produce valuable insights into the dynamics of harmonising legal 
cultures and into the problems resulting from national differences, 
but also from the chaotic effects that any rule introduction is 
likely to have within a particular legal culture. In rejecting the 
idea that law might be—when exposed to and implicated in a 
process of system competition—spontaneously gravitating towards 
uniform solutions, an alternative vision of the alleged bifurcation 
between harmonisation and regulatory competition might emerge. 
                                            
81 See Andreas Nölting, ‘Warten bis der Dachstuhl brennt’, (2004) Manager Magazin, 16 
November 2004, interviewing Professor Michael Adams, who recognizes the German co-
determination regime as an obstacle to German companies’ attractiveness and 
competitiveness. 
82 Teubner (2001), supra. 
83 L. Enriques, 'Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered: What Role for the EC?' (2005) 
ECGI Law Working Paper No. 53/2005 (November) http://ssrn.com/abstract=850005, 20: 
“Complexity, obscurity and uncertainty…” 
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Instead of accounting for harmonisation successes and failures 
with an exclusively quantitative measure, this approach invites a 
closer analysis of the multilevel and poly-contextual evolutionary 
processes set off by legal initiatives, policy instruments, or court 
decisions. 
In fact, European company law has a significance that decisively 
transcends company law as such. Researching the genesis and the 
fate of various Community directives in the field of company law 
improves our general understanding of different legal systems in 
Europe. It is in this light that EU law scholars have increasingly 
highlighted the importance of European learning processes,84 often 
associated now with the Open Method of Co-ordination.85 Our 
understanding of these legal systems, and of company law systems 
in particular, is likely to be increasingly informed by a richer 
assessment of these legal systems and of the rules and standards in 
a specific field. From a perspective that also includes the historical 
trajectories, the political constellations at different times of the 
system’s particular development, and the wider socio-economic 
embeddedness of a specific legal system, we recognise that, indeed, 
our focus on company law tout court et tout près must be widened 
in order to better understand the forces that drive this 
development. This development is, for the time being, only partly 
and, it seems, inadequately depicted by notions of convergence or 
divergence, harmonisation, unification, or regulatory competition. 
These concepts themselves, while regularly being studied with 
regard to their costs, benefits, and alternatives, in fact tell us little 
                                            
84 S. Deakin, 'Regulatory Competition versus Reflexive Harmonisation in European 
Company Law', in D. C. Esty and D. Geradin (eds.), Regulatory Competition and Economic 
Integration. Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2001); C. Barnard/S. 
Deakin, 'Corporate governance, European governance and social rights', in B. Hepple (eds.), 
Social and Labour Rights in a Global Context (Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
85 Hereto, see D. Hodson/I. Maher, 'The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The 
Case of Soft Economic Policy Coordination', (2001) 39 Journal of Common Market Studies 
719-746; J. Scott/D. Trubek, 'Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the 
European Union', (2002) 8 European Law Journal 1-18. 
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about the underlying processes of norm evolution, which they 
purport to explain. 
Of course, critique of regulatory competition has long been 
exercised. Lucian Bebchuk very rightly remarked, some years ago, 
in a simple, straightforward language, that whereas state 
competition furthered interests in some respects, it did so only 
with regard to a specific type of interests. In contrast, ‘state 
competition’, he wrote, failed to enhance issues of ‘significantly 
re-distributive’ quality, issues that directly affect the strength of 
market discipline, and, lastly, issues that implicate the interests of 
not only shareholders and managers but also third parties.86 
What is needed, it seems, is an approach to overcome the 
constantly recurring deadlock between these confronting 
approaches of unification versus regulatory competition. As we 
saw, the long and painful history of trying to harmonise European 
company law can serve as a strong illustration.87 These experiences 
underscore what scholars of European governance have been 
suggesting all along: that we need to rethink the troubling pair of 
‘negative and positive integration’ from another, perhaps wider 
angle.88 One of the more promising suggestions in this regard 
                                            
86 L. A. Bebchuk, 'Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State 
Competition in Corporate Law', (1992) 105 Harvard Law Review 1437-1510; see for a 
restatement of the argument: L. A. Bebchuk/A. Ferrell, 'Federalism and Takeover Law: The 
Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers', in D. C. Esty and D. Geradin (eds.), Regulatory 
Competition and Economic Integration. Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University 
Press, 2001) 
87 R. Buxbaum/K. J. Hopt, Legal Harmonization and the Business Enterprise. Corporate 
and Capital Market Law Harmonization Policy in Europe and the U.S.A. (Walter de 
Gruyter, 1988); E.-M. Kieninger, Wettbewerb der Rechtsordnungen im Europäischen 
Binnenmarkt (Mohr Siebeck, 2002); S. Lombardo, Regulatory Competition in Company Law 
in the European Community. Prerequisites and Limits (Peter Lang, 2002); H. Eidenmüller, 
'Wettbewerb der Gesellschaftsrechte in Europa (Besprechung des EuGH-Urteils 
"Überseering")', (2002) 23 ZIP 2233-2245;  
88 See, e.g., Scharpf, European Governance, supra; M. Jachtenfuchs, 'The Governance 
Approach to European Integration', (2001) 39 Journal of Common Market Studies 245-264; 
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seems to be to re-imagine legislative and regulatory competition as 
a procedural enterprise, a learning experience of dealing with 
different to incompatible norms and institutions. Certainly, 
theorising of regulatory competition has pointed to the 
experimentative and innovative potential of regulatory 
competition in de-centred regulatory spheres all along.89  
 
B Reflexive Governance in European Company Law 
While harmonisation aims at overcoming the disparate tendencies 
of national or regional political economies by pointing out the 
advantages of unifying and levelling existing differences, the idea 
of regulatory competition recognises the all-decisive potential of 
the market as a process of discovery and of elimination.90 While 
harmonisation is likely to come from the top or the centre, 
regulatory competition unfolds allegedly primarily in the 
horizontal. Neither of these rough characterisations certainly 
succeeds in capturing the more sophisticated realisations of these 
paradigms. Regulatory competition can certainly integrate the idea 
of differently legitimated political actors as well as that of a 
hierarchy of norms. Harmonisation, then, can also encompass 
elements ranging from the poles of unification to approximation, 
in between allowing for adaptation and mutual learning. 
Indeed, we find signs that the all-or-nothing opposition of 
harmonisation and regulatory competition does not even seem to 
                                                                                                                
D. Hodson/I. Maher, 'The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The Case of Soft 
Economic Policy Co-ordination', (2001) 39 Journal of Common Market Studies 719-746. 
89 See, ; C. Engel/K. H. Keller (eds.), Governance of Global Networks in the Light of 
Differing Local Values (Nomos, 2000); R. P. Appelbaum/W. F. Felstiner/V. Gessner (eds.), 
Rules and Networks. The Legal Culture of Global Business Transactions (Hart Publishing, 
2001); R. D. Cooter, 'Against Legal Centrism. Review of Robert C. Ellickson, Order 
Without Law. How Neighbors Settle Disputes', (1993) 81 California Law Review 417-429. 
90 See the brllant discussion by E.-M. Kieninger, Wettbewerb der Rechtsordnungen im 
Europäischen Binnenmarkt (Mohr Siebeck, 2002), § 4. 
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find a basis in the Community’s institutional and programmatic 
history. A reconsideration of the Commission’s 1985 White Paper 
on Completing the European Market, which accommodated 
different interests within the framework of a single legal measure91 
makes it appear compatible with contemporary assessments of the 
potential of reflexive law to overcome integration obstacles. In 
this vein, Simon Deakin has convincingly argued for a reflexive 
approach to European (corporate) law development in order to take 
into account the persisting differences among EU Member States’ 
systems of corporate law in order to allow for mutual learning 
processes in the context of European lawmaking.92 Building on 
these arguments, Forstinger has noted that ‘[m]inimum standards 
are seeking to promote diverse, local-level approaches to 
regulatory problems by creating a space for autonomous solutions 
to emerge’.93 
 
III Regulatory Change and the Role of Law 
Beyond this assessment, which is reflected in parallel discussions 
regarding future prospects of European harmonisation 
programmes,94 lies a subtle theoretical appraisal of the 
harmonisation processes that ties this debate back to debates over 
law reform and regulatory change. The paradigm of reflexive law, 
originally developed in response to regulatory deadlock resulting 
                                            
91 See Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European 
Council, COM(85)310 final, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/off/pdf/1985_0310_f_en.pdf 
92 Deakin, supra, at 211. 
93 C. M. FORSTINGER, TAKEOVER LAW IN THE EU AND THE USA. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
(KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL, 2002), at 159. 
94 M. Dougan, 'Minimum Harmonization and the Internal Market', (2000) 37 Common 
Market Law Review 853-885 (describing the move from Single Market harmonization policy 
to the integration of more policy objectives through consecutive treaties since 1986). 
2006] REGULATORY COMPETITION 33 
 
from political pressure against juridification in the 1970s and early 
1980s,95 has received increased recognition in present international 
debates. This recognition has occurred in the context of European 
integration96 and corporate law regulation,97 as well as that of 
environmental law98 and sustainable development.99 At present, 
reflexive law unfolds in an even more intricate manner, as 
comparative views on legal transplantation often fail to capture 
the co-evolutionary processes that unfold in a given legal, social, 
and political order when legal transplantation takes place. As 
argued above, rather than a mere integration into another legal 
order, legal transplantation unfolds as a sophisticated process of 
interaction and confrontation between the imported instrument 
                                            
95 See K. Günther, 'Der Wandel der Staatsaufgaben und die Krise des regulativen Rechts', in 
D. Grimm (eds.), Wachsende Staatsaufgaben - sinkende Steuerungsfähigkeit des Rechts 
(Nomos, 1990); G. Teubner, 'Juridification - Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions', in G. 
Teubner (eds.), Juridification of Social Spheres (Walter de Gruyter, 1987); G. Teubner, 
'Reflexives Recht', (1982) 68 ARSP 13-59; R. Wiethölter, 'Materialization and 
Proceduralization in Modern Law', in G. Teubner (eds.), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare 
State (Walter de Gruyter, 1986). 
96 See M. Dougan, 'Vive la Différence? Exploring the Legal Framework for Reflexive 
Harmonisation Within the Single European Market', in R. A. Miller and P. Zumbansen 
(eds.), Annual of German & European Law, Vol. I (2003) (Berghahn Books, 2004). 
97 Deakin, supra, at 211–13; Forstinger, supra, at 158–69. Forstinger states: “This approach 
uses both centralized regulation of minimum standards to overcome market failures, existing 
specifically in the area of takeovers, and some degree of self-regulation to preserve space for 
autonomous governance at member state level.” Id. at 158. He continues, “The aim of 
reflexive harmonization is to protect the diversity of national legal systems, while at the 
same time seeking to channel the process of evolutionary adaption of rules at state level.” Id. 
at 160. 
98 See E. Orts, 'Reflexive Environmental Law', (1995) 89 Northwestern University Law 
Review 1227-1340; K.-H. Ladeur, Das Umweltrecht der Wissensgesellschaft (Duncker & 
Humblot, 1995); O. Perez, Ecological Sensitivity and Global Legal Pluralism. Rethinking 
the Trade and Environment Conflict (Hart Publishing, 2004); . 
99 See Peter Cornelius & Bruce Kogut, Creating the Responsible Firm: In Search for a New 
Corporate Governance Paradigm, 4 GERMAN L.J. 45 (2003), available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol04No01/PDF_Vol_04_No_01_45-52_Private_C
ornelius_Kogut.pdf; . 
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and other regulatory elements within the receiving system. As an 
imported legal standard is introduced into the receiving legal 
order, other social systems, each with their own internal 
dynamics, are likely to be irritated by this import.100 This 
perspective ultimately illuminates the tenacity displayed by 
different systems during the process of European integration while, 
at the same time, helping us better understand the complex 
interplay of legal reform and cultural and social systems. This is 
particularly important, as the process of European company law 
making continues to be increasingly influenced by changes in the 
law of corporate goverance elsewhere in the world.101 The 
international debate over convergence and divergence of corporate 
governance régimes102 develops in at least two critical dimensions 
that have yet to gain sufficient recognition within mainstream 
scholarship on corporate law and that have important 
repercussions on the further development of European company 
law. One of these dimensions concerns the changes that are taking 
place with regard to the evolution of corporate law through a 
combination of private norm-generation through different 
                                            
100 G. Teubner, 'Legal Irritants: How Unifying Law Ends Up In New Divergences', in P. A. 
Hall and D. Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, 2001). 
101 See, e.g., C. Kirchner/R. W. Painter, 'Takeover Defenses under Delaware Law, the 
Proposed Thirteenth EU Directive and the New German Takeover Law: Comparison and 
Recommendations for Reform', (2002) 50 American Journal of Comparative Law 451-476. 
102 C. Crouch/W. Streeck, 'Introduction: The Future of Capitalist Diversity', in C. Crouch 
and W. Streeck (eds.), Political Economy of Moden Capitalism. Mapping Convergence and 
Diversity (Sage, 1997); H. Hansmann/R. Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate 
Law', (2001) 89 Geo. L. J. 439-468; M. O'Sullivan, 'The political economy of comparative 
corporate governance', (2003) 10 Rev. Int'l Pol. Econ. 23-72; W. W. Bratton/J. A. 
McCahery, 'Comparative Corporate Governance and Barriers to Global Cross Reference', in 
J. A. McCahery,P. Moerland,T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneborg (eds.), Corporate 
Governance Regimes. Convergence and Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2002); J. N. 
Gordon/M. J. Roe (eds.), Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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methods of self-regulation and formal legislation.103 The radical 
changes to the process of lawmaking, through the emergence of 
corporate governance codes, codes of conduct, and 
recommendations of best practice that have evolved in Germany104 
and other countries,105 as well as in international institutions,106 
have an important bearing on our future assessment of corporate 
law from a comparative perspective. The second, crucial 
dimension, ripe for review by contemporary corporate governance 
scholars, deals with the economic pressure experienced by mature 
industrial and post-industrial states to develop innovative means 
for economic and corporate growth. While this need may seem 
                                            
103 An important example is the German Corporate Governance Code, which was 
conceptualized and prepared by two government commissions between 2000 and 2002. This 
code provides corporate actors with a concise account and description of German corporate 
governance and offers recommendations for corporate behavior. German Corporate 
Governance Code, http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/index-e.html; see T. Baums, 
'Interview: Reforming German Corporate Governance: Inside a Law Making Process of a 
very new nature', (2001) 2 German Law Journal at: 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=43 [hereinafter Baums, Interview]; 
T. Baums, 'Company Law Reform in Germany', (2003) 3 J. Corp. L. Stud. 181-189. 
104 See Baums, Interview, supra; T. Baums (eds.), Bericht der Regierungskommission 
Corporate Governance. Unternehmensführung, Unternehmenskontrolle, Modernisierung 
des Aktienrechts (Otto Schmidt, 2001); P. Zumbansen, 'The Privatization of Corporate Law? 
Corporate Governance Codes and Commercial Self-Regulation', (2002b) Juridikum 136-
145. 
105 A instructive assessment of the UK is provided in B. R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW. 
THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION (CLARENDON PRESS, 1997). For theoretical 
background, see R. Baggott, 'Regulatory Reform in Britain: The Changing Face of Self-
Regulation', (1989) 67 Public Administration 435-454; J. Black, 'Constitutionalising Self-
Regulation', (1996) 59 Modern Law Review 24. 
106 See, e.g., the Corporate Governance Principles issued by the OECD, available at 
http://www.oecd.org; see also Carolin F. Hillemanns, UN Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, 4 
GERMAN L.J. 1065 (2003) (for a development in international corporate social 
responsibility), available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol04No10/PDF_Vol_04_ 
No_10_1065-1080_European_Hillemanns.pdf 
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almost painfully commonplace,107 its realisation, in the context of 
radically interconnected markets and immense pressure on local 
and transnational spheres of production,108 constitutes a pivotal 
issue for contemporary comparative scholars working with 
corparate governance.109 European company law and a closer look 
at the dynamics and tensions continuously unfolding in this field 
thus becomes a part and a starting point into a wider research into 
the contemporary political economy of governance through law in 
a globally integrating world. 
  
A Harmonization, Competition and Integration as Narratives  
Let us finally return to the role of law in the development of 
European company law. Our challenge remains to unfold the 
wealth of dimensions inherent to the regulatory and normative 
vocabulary with which we engage in our contemporary critique of 
regulatory competition. The distinction between regulatory 
competition and harmonisation, regardless of how mitigated and 
tamed the former, how sophisticated and principled the latter—
                                            
107 See Reinventing Europe: Innovation: With so much of its industrial base ageing and 
resistant to change, how can Europe close the research and development gap with 
America?, THE ECONOMIST TECHNOLOGY QUARTERLY, Sept. 6, 2003, at 28, available at 
2003 WL 58583964. 
108 See J. R. Hollingsworth, 'New perspectives on the spatial dimensions of economic 
coordination: tensions between globalization and social systems of production', (1998) 5 
Review of International Political Economy 482-507; K. Ibata-Arens, 'The comparative 
political economy of innovation', (2003) 10 Review of International Political Economy 147-
165. 
109 See M. O'Sullivan, 'The innovative enterprise and corporate governance', (2000) 24 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 393-416; W. W. Powell, 'The Capitalist Firm in the 
Twenty-First Century: Emerging Patterns in Western Enterprise', in P. Dimaggio (eds.), The 
Twenty-First-Century Firm. Changing Economic Organization in international Perspective 
(Princeton University Press, 2001); P. Zumbansen, Innovation und Pfadabhängigkeit. Das 
Recht der Unternehmensverfassung in der Wissensgesellschaft (Habilitation thesis, 
University of Frankfurt) forthcoming). 
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this distinction does not allow us to understand why a certain 
outcome might be a good one. Indeed, the debate over regulatory 
competition versus harmonisation does not by itself open a 
normative dimension, as it does not provide an adequately rich 
account or foundation on which to ask whether the outcome was 
‘good’. The answer, however, is existential in light of the ever-
growing integration of worldwide activity and the hyper-sped 
collision of different experiences and value systems.110 
Only a thorough assessment of the intricate history (call it 
narratives) and challenges of national governance experiences (call 
them administrative and constitutional law) can shed light on the 
interests as well as the lingering hopes as well as the remembered 
or repressed frustrations that tacitly but still very powerfully 
shape any form of political interaction. The examples of law 
reform touched upon in this article provide rich material evidence 
for the complexity of international integration and system 
competition. In order, however, to unfold a richer dimension of 
regulatory processes (competition, coordination, interaction etc.), 
we need to include our assessment of changes in lawmaking, the 
transformation and hybridisation of formerly public governance, 
the proliferation of laws, codes of conducts, conventions into our 
exercise of rethinking regulatory action. Only here can we trace 
the journeys that notions and terms central to our conceptualising 
take throughout history and how they perform in times of 
challenge. The picture on regulatory competition, then, changes 
dramatically: not only do governments (or parts or different levels 
of government) compete and certain sets of rules, but whole legal, 
social, political and economic cultures, their current states and 
their historical narratives compete. 
                                            
110 P. B. Stephan, 'Regulatory cooperation and competition: the search for virtue', in G. A. 
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The study of Europe’s unique history and experience of 
‘integration through law’111 points to an intricate interplay between 
succeeding, overlapping and repeating phases of competing 
policies of building a peaceful union, an economic, a political 
union.112 These terms hardly capture the wealth of political 
imagination that has gone into and continues to inform European 
integration, and what is more, they might be misleading in their 
respective exclusiveness and totality.113 They do, however, already 
suffice to call into question the conceptual pair of harmonisation 
and regulatory competition when applied to explain and to 
illuminate the manifold faces of Europe’s search of ‘meaning and 
purpose’.114 With a view to the degrees of European and 
international cooperation and coordination that have been 
characterised as multilevel governance,115 one could be tempted to 
argue for a move from harmonisation and competition on to 
different degrees of regulatory coordination, cooperation, or 
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interaction to overcome the above described shortcomings in the 
concepts of competition and harmonisation. Yet, a mere 
substitution of the diametric scheme of regulatory competition 
versus harmonisation by a model of ‘regulatory interaction’ might 
still fall short of unfolding a comprehensive description of 
processes of international and transnational integration. The 
reasons for this are easier to find than an answer to our question of 
how to fruitfully complement or even to overcome the pair of 
harmonisation/competition. Concepts such as harmonisation, 
regulatory competition, and regulatory interaction seem to share a 
striking shortcoming in that they remain too exclusively centred 
on specific premises of regulation in the first place. The starting 
point of the preceding discussion therefore was the contestation of 
actor-centred premises that would inform a programme of 
regulatory interaction, and that could also be said to lie behind the 
known approaches to harmonisation and regulatory competition.116 
In order to further explore and, ultimately, to reconsider these 
approaches within a wider regulatory framework of the law of 
corporate governance, we need to study the changing face of 
regulation as such. This will eventually allow us to place the 
inquiry into the prospects of European company law in a larger 
context of regulatory developments, not only on the European 
level, but also on the Nation State level and globally.117 A central 
tenet of this article has been that we need to assess the chances of 
border-crossing regulatory régimes such as European company law 
as part of a transnational law of corporate governance against the 
background of regulatory transformations inside and outside of the 
Nation State. 
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We are well advised to carefully trace the changes of both actors 
and actions as they can be observed in complex, contemporary 
regulatory environments. In short: where we see a continuing 
erosion of the conceptual boundaries between the (political, 
interventionist, welfare, post-regulatory, supervision) state and 
(allegedly a-political) market, we begin to question the 
applicability and translatability of our concepts of state/market 
and public/private in the realm of transnational regulation.118 It is 
only through the observation of this repetition of the 
public/private distinction inside and outside of the Nation State 
that we may learn more about the chances of regulatory politics in 
a dramatically de-centralised, global knowledge economy. This has 
repercussions on our understanding of regulatory instruments and 
spaces. While these instruments (laws, directives, decisions, 
political programmes, codes of conduct) show a complex mix of 
hard and soft law, political intervention and self-regulation, the 
spaces and places of regulation become horizontally and vertically 
open. Regulation today takes place in many different spaces and 
on many different levels of norm-creation, increasingly 
challenging the fixture on the state as the sole author of binding 
norms.119 In this multilevel game of various public and private 
actors, traditional concepts of legitimacy have become as 
questionable as ideas of causation in contemporary tort law. It is 
here where we begin to understand the ways in which actors and 
authors occupy regulatory spaces that seem to follow rules that are 
less man-made than that they unfold from within the constant 
collision of heterogeneous functional imperatives as well as 
normative claims. From this perspective, then, our inquiry might 
add to a critical reassessment of the role and the nature of law 
itself. 
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B LAW’S BOUNDARIES? 
This would, however, move our inquiry well beyond the confines 
of the so-far described assessments of European company law. It 
would entail questions such as which role law can play in the 
facilitation of regulatory competition. What role can law play, if 
law itself were to be seen as no more than one particular social 
system whose function is to stabilise expectations? More 
importantly, and on a normative plane, what if law as a particular 
social system was just one among other systems, the rationalities 
of which constantly collide, and where the outcome might be far 
from any unification? 
Perhaps, law ought to be understood as a social system whose 
function should be seen in allowing communicative meaning to 
survive from the battlefield of contemporary conflict into 
tomorrow’s search for stability, certainty (and memory). Law can 
fulfil this stabilising function—despite, or should we say because 
of its relative autonomy from the rule-production that is otherwise 
taking place in the parameters of economic exchange or political 
discourse. Law’s reproduction of meaning consists of capturing a 
specific, timely understanding of ‘legal’ as differentiated from 
‘illegal’, without however allowing a larger societal discourse to 
set, shape, and further define this meaning and distinction of 
legal/illegal—against the tides of domestic and international 
conflict. Instead, law has an introverted tendency through which it 
develops rules and norms that are informed by yesterday’s and 
today’s definition and assignment of legal/illegal, and that will 
serve as guiding post and reminder when applied to conflict 
situations tomorrow. In a paradoxical moment of vulnerability and 
sovereignty over the concrete case, the law relies on its rules, 
which have been developed through repeated application in 
previous cases, and it is through this application today that the 
law constantly refines and improves its sensitivity for each new 
and different case. As such, law itself allows for an in-depth 
assessment of the various semantic heritages that are at work in 
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our use of legal terms.120 At the same time, law competes with 
other narratives in making sense of the present regulatory 
challenges. In fact, it is only by way of engaging in an 
interdisciplinary inquiry that we can better understand the 
potential for law in this process. If it is true that legal terms, their 
history, and trajectory transport—even if in hidden form—the 
political aspirations and frustrations that accompanied their 
emergence or followed their failure, than a close look at our 
conceptions of governance might offer a promising way towards 
better assessing the chances of changing forms of political action—
within and beyond Europe.121 
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